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Taxation plays an important role in modern market economy, and to some extent, 
tax burden influences and restricts economic behavior of enterprises. Providing 
financial report to decrease information asymmetry and agency costs, as an important 
aspect of economic behavior, of course, is affected by tax burden. This dissertation 
starts with the unique viewpoint of macro tax burden, selects accounting conservatism 
as a typical aspect of financial reporting, and uses data from China’s A-Share capital 
markets to empirically test the relation between tax burdens and accounting 
conservatism. Based on the test above, using compensation contracts as pointcut and 
dynamic adjustment of sensitivity between compensation and earnings as link, this 
dissertation analyzes the economic consequence of tax burden. 
This dissertation consists of six chapters, major contents of each chapter are 
outlined as follow: 
Chapter1 is introduction, which briefly introduces the background, motivation, 
framework, main contents and possible innovation of the research. Above all, 
introduction is a preliminary summary of the dissertation. 
Chapter2 is a literature review of related domestic and foreign research, which 
mainly contains those two topics: accounting conservatism and compensation 
contracts. The purpose of literature review is to further understand the necessity and 
sense of this study. 
Chapter3 describes the historical background and experience of China’s tax 
reform, basing on this description, the dissertation presents the main test variables and 
analyzes the difference of tax burden among different areas. 
Chapter4 is the empirical result of relation between tax burden and accounting 
conservatism. Using Basu (1997) model, this chapter tests the influence of tax burden 
and excess tax burden on conservatism. 
Chapter5 analyzes the accounting information, especially accounting earnings’ 
function in the pricing of top executives market, which is mainly about influence of 
tax burden on compensation-performance sensitivity. This chapter can help us 
understand the pricing function of accounting information and the efficiency of 
China’s capital markets. 
Chapter6 summaries the dissertation, it consists of the findings of the study, the 
lessons we learn, and the caveats of research. At last, we point out the directions for 
future research. 














First, tax burden is one of important factors affecting accounting conservatism. 
This dissertation shows that tax burden increases accounting conservatism 
significantly, those results support tax hypothesis of accouting conservatism. 
Secondly, accounting earnings has a dynamic adjustment process in the pricing 
of top executive compensation (only in profit-making enterprise). In the same words, 
tax burden decreases accounting earnings by accounting conservatism, when pricing 
the top executive compensation in accordance with accounting earnings, there is a 
positive adjustment of accounting earnings. Empirical results show that tax burden 
increases the compensation-earnings sensitivity significantly. 
This study is exploratory in nature, major improvements and innovations are 
evident in the following aspects: 
1. This dissertation researches on the relation between tax burden and accounting 
conservatism, these findings can help us understand economic consequence of tax 
burden, particularly about financial reporting behavior. There is little prior literature 
(especially in China) on the relation between tax burden and conservatism, so this 
study provides incremental evidence. 
2. Prior researches mainly use ERT (efficient rates of tax) as proxy variable of tax 
burden, which may lead to endogeneity. In this dissertation, we use (excess) macro tax 
burden to reduce endogeneity problem, so the results are more reliable. 
3. This dissertation studies on whether accounting earnings which are affected by 
tax burden adjust in the pricing of top executive compensation, so it provides 
empirical evidence on the pricing function of accounting information, additionally, it 
help us understand the efficiency of China’s capital markets. Prior researches on 
efficiency of capital markets mainly focus on the pricing of share, so this study 
provides new perspective. 
4. China has launched a new tax reform from 2004, and the economic 
consequence of the reform has drawn attentions from scholars, governments and other 
people. This study provides new evidence on the above issue from accounting (micro) 
perspective. The evidence that difference of tax burden among areas leads to different 
economic consequence provides more profound understanding of “institution is 
important”. 
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① 本杰明·富兰克林在美国宪法通过后给一位法国科学家的信中如此说到(详见 http://baike.baidu.com/view 
/8985.htm)。 
② 详见《政治经济学及赋税原理》(p134-135)，大卫·李嘉图著，丰俊功译，北京：光明日报出版社，2009。
英文版可参阅 Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, David Ricardo, The Commercial Press, 1930(edited 







































后于 1984 年、1994 年和 2004 年进行了三次重大的税收制度改革，税收在财政
收入中所占的比重日益重要。如表 1-1 所示，在 2000 年到 2008 年间，税收收入
占财政收入的比重基本上都在 90%以上，只有在 2002 年和 2008 年略低于 90%，
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算，中国税收收入占国内生产总值(Gross Domestic Product，简称GDP)的比重 ①(以
下简称税收负担)在 2000 年到 2008 年间的平均值 ②为 15.95%，各年的税收负担






表 1-1：税收收入占财政收入和国内生产总值比重    (单位：亿元) 
年度 税收收入 财政收入 占财政收入比 GDP 占 GDP 比 
2000 12665.80 13395.23 94.55% 99214.60 12.77% 
2001 15165.50 16386.00 92.55% 109655.20 13.83% 
2002 16996.60 18903.00 89.91% 120332.70 14.12% 
2003 20466.10 21715.25 94.25% 135822.80 15.07% 
2004 25718.00 26396.47 97.43% 159878.30 16.09% 
2005 30865.80 31649.29 97.52% 183217.40 16.85% 
2006 37636.27 38760.20 97.10% 211923.50 17.76% 
2007 49449.29 51321.78 96.35% 249529.90 19.82% 
2008 54219.62 61330.25 88.41% 314045.00 17.26% 
注：税收收入数据来自于国家税务总局网站(http://www.chinatax.gov.cn/n8136506/n8136593/n8137633/ 






                                                        
① 邓子基(2008)指出计算宏观税收负担的三个指标，分别为国民收入税收负担率、国民生产总值税收负担率
和国内生产总值税收负担率(详见《财政学》(第三版)第 107 到 108 页，邓子基主编，高等教育出版社)，肖
捷(2010)指出衡量一个国家的宏观税收负担水平，一般是用一定时期的税收总量或者税收和非税收收入总量
占同时期的 GDP 比重来加以衡量(详见《走出宏观税负的误区》一文，《中国改革》2010 年第 10 期，亦可
参见 http://www.chinareform.net/2010/1001/21529.html)，因此本文采用这一衡量方法。 
② 本处的平均值计算取简单算术平均值，即所有年度税收占 GDP 比重之和除以总年数。 














































                                                        
① 本文转引自《会计思想史》第 359 页，迈克尔·查特菲尔德著，文硕等译，北京：中国商业出版社，1988。 
② 真实业绩的概念由 Cornett, Marcus 和 Tehranian(2008)提出，在“Corporate Governance and 
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图 1-1：税收收入占财政收入和 GDP 比重(2000-2008) 
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